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1
I. INTRODUCTION
After laying her daughter down to sleep, Lora Lohr began to feel as if she
was losing consciousness. When Lohr, a cardiac technician, reached for her
pulse she found none. At the hospital, her physician discovered that she was
suffering from complete heart block.2 The wire in her pacemaker had failed to
deliver the necessary impulses to her heart.3 As Lohr stated "the device that
was supposed to keep me alive almost killed me."4 After three years of painful
surgeries and complications, Lohr sued the pacemaker's manufacturer,
1Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2579 (1996). See also Gary L. Wilson, Listen to the FDA: The Medical Device Amendments
Do Not Preempt Tort Law, 19 HAMUNE L. REV. 409 (1996) (discussing the elimination of
the "rose garden" under the regulations promulgated by the FDA).
2Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2248 (1996).
3Sharon Schmickle, Medtronic, Consumers Square Off, STAR TRiB., Apr. 24, 1996, at
5A. The pacemaker's lead wire consisted of a thin, insulated wire that connected the
pacemaker to the patient's heart. Id.
4 Joan Biskupic, Manufacturer Liability Is at Heart of Pacemaker Case, WASH. PosT, Apr.
22, 1996, at A4.
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Medtronic, for the cost of her medical treatment. 5 Medtronic refused to pay
these claims and Lohr filed a tort liability suit in the State of Florida.
6
After the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group Inc.,7 medical device manufacturers have successfully asserted
federal preemption as a defense against state product liability suits. Many
federal courts have upheld this defense in common law actions brought against
medical device manufacturers. 8 Although these courts agree about the
existence of the preemption defense, they have disagreed about its scope.9 In
Medtronic v. Lohr, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this dispute by
defining the scope of the preemption defense applicable under the Medical
Device Amendments. 10 In fashioning its decision, the Court balanced the need
to protect public health against the desire to encourage medical innovation.
This comment discusses the Medical Device Amendments of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and its effect on the marketing of medical
products. Part II examines the statutory language of the MDA and its
regulatory impact on medical devices. Part III explores the history of the
preemption doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Cipollone. Part IV
delineates the facts and procedural history of Medtronic v. Lohr and analyzes
the effect of this case on the federal preemption of state common law suits.
Finally, Part V assesses the impact of this decision on the medical device
industry and the expansiveness of the preemption doctrine.
5Supreme Court to Hear Pacemaker Litigation (National Public Radio broadcast, Apr.
23,1996). As Lohr stated: "I've had to have five operations due to one lead wire.... I'm
looking at them having to crack my entire chest open to pull more wires out because I
have too much hardware in my body from that one lead wire going bad. I've accrued
$200,000 worth of medical bills, [and] more to come ..." Id.
6Michael Unger, Supreme Court Hands Defeat to Medical Device Companies, NEwsDAY,
June 27, 1996, at A53. Lohr sued after Medtronic rejected her request for about $10,000
in medical bills and lost wages. Id.
7505 U.S. 504 (1992).
8See Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995); Reeves v. Acromed Corp.,
44 F.3d 300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995); Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp.,
42 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 1994); Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 1994);
Duncan v. Iolab, 12 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416
(5th Cir. 1993); Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 63 F.3d
25 (1st Cir. 1995); Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ill. 1991), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp, 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated,
116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 65 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 1995);
Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994); Stefl v. Medtronic, Inc., 916 S.W.2d
879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc, 70 F.3d 39 (6th Cir.
1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2576.
9 See Anne-Marie Dega, The Battle Over Medical Device Regulation: Do the Federal
Medical Device Amendments Preempt State Tort Law Claims, 27 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 615 (1996)
(discussing the division among courts as to whether the Medical Device Amendments
should preempt state common law actions).
10 Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2240 (1996).
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[I. MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS
The Medical Device Amendments (MDA) of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1976 govern the regulation of medical devices.11 Congress
enacted the MDA "to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
intended for human use.....12 Prior to these amendments, the FDA lacked the
ability to review the safety of medical devices before their entry into the
market.13 In the early 1970s, an intrauterine device (IUD) called the Dalkon
shield caused thousands of women to suffer toxic shock, infertility, and pelvic
infections due to a design defect. 14 However, by the time the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) became aware of these injuries, these devices had
already inflicted permanent physical damage. 15 To correct this system,
Congress enacted the MDA to protect consumers before these dangerous
products reached the market. 16
The MDA classifies medical devices into three different categories based
upon the level of regulation or control necessary to provide a reasonable
assurance of safety to society. Every medical device is subject to general controls
that require reporting and record keeping procedures and establish adequate
labeling standards. 17 Class I devices pose little or no threat to public health or
safety and are subject to only general controls.18 Class II devices are subject to
general and special controls. 19 Special controls include performance standards,
1121 U.S.C. § 301 (1972).
1221 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
13See Gail H. Javitt, I've Got You Under My Skin-And I Can't Get Redress: An Analysis
of Recent Case Law Addressing Preemption of Manufacturer Liability for Class III Medical
Devices, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 553, 558 (1994) (discussing the number of injuries caused
by medical devices before the passage of the MDA).
14 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 710-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989).
15See Mary G. Boguslaski, Classification and Performance Standards Under the 1976
Medical Device Amendments, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 421, 423 (1985) (detailing the
legislative history of the MDA along with a discussion of the injuries caused by
intrauterine devices).
16 See, H.R. Rep. No.94-8533, at 10-11 (1976); S. Rep. No.94-33 at 10 (1975).
17See Bianca I. Truitt, Comment, Injured Consumers and the FDA: Should Federal
Preemption Protect Medical Device Manufacturers Under A Quasi-Governmental Immunity?,
15 J. LEGAL MED. 155,157 (1994) (discussing the general, minimum controls on all three
classes of medical devices).
1821 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (West 1997); see also Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann,
Preemption and Medical Devices: The. Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV. 895, 912 (1994)
(examples of Class I devices include tongue depressors, ice bags, elastic bandages, and
crutches).
1921 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(13); see Adler & Mann, supra note 18, at 913 (Class 1I devices
include hearing aides, resuscitators, and hypodermic needles).
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postmarket surveillance, patient registries and other guidelines.20 The MDA
subjects Class III devices to special scrutiny because, although they aim to
support or sustain human life, Class III devices exist witin the human body and
present an "unreasonable risk of illness or injury" if not properly regulated. 21
A medical device manufacturer may introduce its product to the market
under three different procedures stipulated by the FDA: 1) premarket approval
(PMA); 2) premarket notification; or 3) the investigational device exemption.
Generally, before a new Class III device can be placed on the market, it must
meet premarket approval standards.22 The manufacturer must prove the safety
and efficacy of the device to the FDA before receiving approval to market the
product. 23 Under the premarket notification exemption, devices which were
on market before May 28, 1976 need not meet general PMA requirements. 24 If
a device is labeled "substantially equivalent," a limited form of review exists
whereby a manufacturer must submit an application for premarket notification
as specified in section 510(k) of the MDA. 25 Premarket notification procedures
require a manufacturer to submit an application at least ninety days prior to
introducing a device to the market.26 The FDA then makes a determination of
whether the device qualifies as "substantially equivalent."27 Eighty to ninety
percent of medical devices receive approval under the premarket notification
standard. 28 In 1990, Congress enacted the Safe Medical Device Act to stiffen the
requirements for companies seeking to market their products under the
loophole created by section 510(k).29 The new rules require manufacturers to
20Adler & Mann, supra note 18, at 913.
2121 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(c); see Adler & Mann, supra note 18, at 914 (Examples of Class
III devices invlude pacemakers, cardiac catheters, hip replacements, and heart valves).
2221 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1). The PMA standard requires an applicant to submit any
known evidence showing whether the device is safe and effective.
2321 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(B)(I)(2)(A)-(E). The FDA must approve an application for PMA
unless: (1) there is a failure to establish a reasonable assurance that the device is safe or
effective under the recommended conditions of use; (2) the manufacturing methods do
not conform to the requirements for good manufacturing practices; (3) the proposed
labeling is false or misleading; or (4) the device does not conform to an applicable
performance standard. Id.
2421 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c)(1) (1994).
2521 U.S.C. § 360e (1994).
2621 C.F.R. §§ 808.1-808.100 (1995).
27 See Roger W. Bivans, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of State
Common-Law Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74TEX. L. REV. 1087 (1996) (discussing the
reasons for allowing state lawsuits against devices approved under the premarket
notification process).
28 H.R. Rep. No. 102-808 (1990).
29 Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511.
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include a 510(k) statement or 510(k) summary along with garnering Class III
certification in order to market a device as "substantially equivalent."30
Many differences exist between the premarket notification process and the
PMA procedure. The premarket notification process typically entails twenty
hours to complete, while the PMA process requires 1,200 hours. 31 In addition,
the PMA process requires the device to be tested by a panel of experts for safety
and effectiveness. 32 In contrast, the premarket notification demands only raw
data to support the assertion that the device is "substantially equivalent" to a
device which existed prior to 1976.33 This shortcut permits a device to be
marketed without ever being reviewed or approved by the FDA. This loophole
allows a medical device manufacturer to secure the preemptive powers of the
MDA without ever being subjected to the regulatory controls established by
this law
Under the investigational device exemption, a manufacturer allows
physicians to test medical devices in clinical trials before introducing these
products to the market. The FDA classifies these products under the
investigational device exemption (IDE). 34 The IDE process is designed to
encourage innovation in order to develop new medical devices. Recently, the
Sixth Circuit, in Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Systems, held that a plaintiff's
product liability claims were preempted by the MDA under section 360k(a).35
Due to the specific rules for products approved under the IDE, the Sixth Circuit
held that state claims relating to these devices should be preempted by
conflicting federal requirements. 36 To foster the creation of new medical
devices, the IDE procedure allows products to be marketed without being
subjected to the rigorous PMA process. This encourages innovation, but fails
to provide the safeguards pledged in enacting the MDA.
III. PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that the laws of the
United States "shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any state
3059 Fed. Reg. 64287 (1994) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 807 (1995).
31Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 384 (1987).
3221 U.S.C. § 360e(c) (1994).
3357 Fed. Reg. 18,062 (1992).
3421 U.S.C. § 360j(g); 21 C.F.R. § 812.3(g).
3570 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1995) (remanded by the Supreme Court to be considered in
light of the holding in Lohr). See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the MDA's preemption section 360k(a).
3670 F.3d at 41. The court stated that the "representations that can, cannot, and must
be made about an investigational device are all determined by the FDA." Id. at 42.
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to the contrary notwithstanding."37 The intent behind the preemption doctrine
was to provide uniform laws and regulations for individuals and businesses
across the country. To avoid conflicting sets of rules, a state law which imposes
different standards than a federal law will be preempted. However, the police
powers granted to the states under the Constitution will not be preempted
absent "the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to do so.' 38
Prior to the 1980s, few courts allowed the preemption defense to invalidate
state product liability suits. 39 Then, in the landmark case of Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal law governing advertising on
cigarette packages preempted state actions based on claims that manufacturers
failed to warn smokers about the danger of this activity.40 In Cipollone, the son
of a deceased smoker challenged the Third Circuit's preemption of his state tort
claim. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 stated that
it would be a violation of this law "to fail to disclose, clearly and prominently,
in all advertising and on every pack, box, carton or container [of cigarettes] that
cigarette smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer and
other diseases."41 This act also included an explicit preemption provision.42
However, this provision "merely prohibited state and federal rulemaking
bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements" and did not preempt
state law damage actions.43
In 1969, Congress modified the preemption section of the 1965 law. The new
section read: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provi-
37U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
38 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (referring to the United
States Warehouse Act).
39 Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government
Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903,907-08 (1996) (discussing the appropriate
degree of preemption which should be inferred from the Cipollone decision. The author
believes that Cipollone has been misinterpreted and preemption should be limited to
cases where a defendant can show compliance with an applicable safety requirement).
40505 U.S. 504 (1992).
41 id. at 513 (quoting 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964)).
42 The preemption section of the 1965 act stated:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in confor-
mity with the Provisions of this Act.
Id. at 514.
431d. at 518. The Court reasoned that the preemption section "superseded only
positive enactments by legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate particular
warning labels." 505 U.S. at 518-19.
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sions of this Act.'"44 By enacting a statutory provision explicitly preempting
state law, the Cipollone Court needed to look no further than the express
language of the statute to infer preemption.4 5 The 1969 Act banned not only
'statements relating to smoking, but requirement[s] or prohibition[s] . . .
imposed under state law."4 6 The broader language of the revised preemption
section was found to encompass state law actions.47 The Court held that the
terms "requirements" and "prohibition" included not only "state statutes or
positive enactments of law, but also common law damage actions premised on
a breach of a legal duty. "48 The Court noted that "common law damage actions
... are premised on the existence of a legal duty, and it is difficult to say that
such actions do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions."' 49 However, the
Court limited the preemption defense to plaintiff's failure to warn claim.50 The
preemption section was not read to apply to express warranty, intentional
fraud, misrepresentation or conspiracy actions. In the 1969 revisions, Congress
defined the scope of preemption in the express language of the statute.5 1 The
statute's considerable detail and specific requirements for cigarette advertising
justified a determination that Congress intended federal law to control this
practice. 52
Following Cipollone, courts have interpreted the term "requirement" to
include state tort lawsuits.53 In determining whether the preemption defense
applies, courts should examine Congressional intent in creating the particular
legislation. Federal legislation preempts state laws when "the scheme of federal
regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that
Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state regulation."54 The party
4415 U.S.C. § 1331 (1969).
45 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992).
461d. at 519.
47 Id.
481d. at 519-21 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (b)).
49 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 522; see also Noah, supra note 39.
50Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31.
5 1The Court noted that its analysis should be governed entirely by the express
language of the Act. Id. at 517.
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (West 1997); see also Mark Hermann & Geoffrey J. Ritts,
Preemption and Medical Devices: A Response to Adler & Mann, 51 FooD & DRUG L.J. 1, 7
(1996) (arguing that the use of the term 'requirement' in the medical device amendments
preemption clause is consistent with Cipollone's preemption of state lawsuits).
53CSX Trans. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732 (1993) (holding that federal regulations
preempted the state from allowing the plaintiff a common law negligence recovery); see
cases cited supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Hermann & Ritts, supra note 52,
at 1 n.4.
54Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
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asserting preemption bears the burden of proof and must demonstrate an
unmistakable intent by Congress to preempt the area of law. To assess
Congress' intent, one commentator has suggested that courts employ a
two-part test to determine the breadth of federal preemption.55 First, a court
must examine the federal law to determine whether it applies to the particular
device. 56 Next, the court should "analyze each of, the plaintiff's claims to
determine whether it imposes requirements that are 'different from' or 'in
addition to' the federal requirements."57 If a state common law action creates
additional requirements on a device, the federal statute will preempt the
application of state law.58
The MDA contains an express preemption provision clause in section 360k(a)
that states:
[N]o state or political subdivision of a state may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a medical device intended for human use any
requirement:
(1) Which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) Which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under
this chapter.
59
In enacting the MDA, Congress empowered the FDA to promulgate
regulations to enforce this law.60 The FDA propagated a regulation recognizing
the preemptive power of section 360k(a). This regulation, 21 C.ER. Section
808.1(b), prohibits states from continuing requirements "having the force and
effect of law, whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation or court
decisions, as state requirements subject to preemption by federal law."61 The
55 See Stephen D. Harris, Preemption of State Tort Claims Under the Medical Device
Amendments, 24 CoLO. L. REV. 2217,2218 (1995) (discussing the two-part test employed
to resolve preemption claims under the MDA).
561d.
5 71d. at 2218 n. 36 (quoting Slater v. Optical Corp., 961 F.2d 1330-1333 (7th Cir. 1992).
5 8See, e.g., Cynthia B. Stewart, Casenote, Medical Device Litigation: Federal Preemption
of State Tort Claims: King v. Collagen Corp., 2 J. PHARMACY & L. 357 (1993) (declaring the
King decision consistent with the majority viewpoint as well as FDA intent in
preempting state law claims).
5921 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
6021 U.S.C. § 371(a); see Marilyn P. Westerfield, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What
Does Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 263 (1994) (stating that since Congress has not
expressly stated otherwise, the FDA should continue to regulate the medical device
industry).
6121 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (West 1997). "State or local requirements are preempted only
when the FDA has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific
requirements applicable to the particular device under the act.... Id.
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FDA's regulation narrowed the meaning of the term requirement to a "specific
counterpart regulation or specific requirement[s] applicable to a particular
device."62 In enacting amendments to the MDA in 1990 and 1992, Congress left
Section 808.1(b) intact and inferred that this regulation is consistent with
MDA's preemption of common law actions.6 3 Since the meaning of the term
"requirement" is ambiguous in the statute, courts continue to struggle with the
degree of specificity which will trigger preemption under the MDA.
Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Medtronic v. Lohr, every
federal appellate court except one followed the precedent established in
Cipollone to preempt most common law actions brought against devices
approved under the MDA.64 The First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits rejected reading any device-specific requirements into section
360k(a).65 The First Circuit exemplified the majority position in Mendes v.
Medtronic.66 In Mendes, the court held that the MDA preempts a plaintiff's state
claims for implied warranty, negligent manufacturing and failure to warn.
67
The Seventh Circuit also interpreted the statement "no requirement or
prohibition" to include state common law rules.68 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit,
in Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., allowed a plaintiff's defective design claims to
escape preemption under the requirement standard of section 360k(a).69 The
Moore court held that since no federal regulations existed to govern tampon
design, composition, or construction, the preemption clause did not apply
7O
62 Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1344 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2240
(1996); see also Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(noting that a court must defer to an agency's interpretation unless it is arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute).
63Cf. Lamontagne v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 834 F. Supp. 576,583 (D. Conn.
1993), affd, 44 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1995).
64See generally Dega, supra note 9; Hermann & Ritts, supra note 52, at 1 n.4-5.
65Lohr v. Medtronics, 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996);
Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995); Reeves v. Acromed Crop., 44 F.3d
300 (5th Cir. 1995) Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 1994); Mendes
v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994). But see Anguianov. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
Co., Inc. 44 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to demand that
the MDA's requirements be device-specific for the preemption clause to apply. Id.
6618 F.3d at 13.
67ld.
68Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir., 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2576
(1996).
69Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Jana Louise
Grauberger, Feldt v. Mentor Corporation: The Fifth Circuit Examines Preemption and the
Medical Device Amendments in the Context of PenileImplant Litigation, 70 TUL. L. REv. 1181
(1996) (the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its decision in Moore by holding that federal
regulations do not preempt state law actions based on design defects).
70867 F.2d at 243.
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The majority position advocates that the statutory language of the MDA
preempts state requirements including jury judgments in state lawsuits which
conflict with federal rules.
In comparison, the minority viewpoint espoused in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp.
held that the MDA's PMA process did not constitute a specific federal
requirement.7 1 The PMA process standardizes its approval process for all Class
III devices, rather than making device-specific requirements. 72 In Kennedy, the
Ninth Circuit required device specificity based on its statutory interpretation
of section 808.1 and held that "courts should not ignore the specific regulation
of a particular Class III device."73 The court found further evidence of the lack
of congressional intent to preempt state action from the MDA's Savings
Clause.74 This clause states that "compliance with an order issued under this
section shall not relieve any person from liability under Federal or State law."75
Kennedy diverged from the majority viewpoint based on the lack of specific
requirements applicable to a particular device. Without additional
requirements which conflict with federal law, the MDA's preemption clause
did not apply.
The different standards utilized by the FDA to test medical devices have
received differing levels of preemption by the courts. 76 Every device approved
under the investigational device exemption has received complete preemption
against state lawsuits. Similarly, most courts have ruled that federal
preemption will apply to claims against devices marketed under the PMA.
However, courts have split as to whether state suits will be preempted when
devices are marketed under the premarket notification standard in section
510(k).77 The Eleventh Circuit preempted Lohr's negligent manufacturing and
warning claims. However, her negligent design and strict liability suits were
allowed to proceed against Medtronic. The Supreme Court sought to resolve
7167 F.3d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d
1273 (Haw. 1992), Haudrich v. Howmedica, 642 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994)
(advocating the position that the MDA does not preempt common law actions).
72 See 21 C.F.R. § 814.1-818.45.
73Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459.
741d. at 1460; see 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d).
7521 U.S.C. § 360h(d). The clause also states, "[i]n awarding damages for economic
loss in an action brought for the enforcement of any such liability, the value to the
plaintiff in such action of any remedy provided him under such order shall be taken
into account." Id.
76 See Hermann & Ritts, supra note 52, at 2 n.9 (detailing the levels of preemption
given to Class II and III devices). See also Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1458-59.
77 Hermann & Ritts, supra note 52, at 2, n.4-8 (presenting a listing of the cases which
have invoked preemption under the MDA).
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the conflict between different circuits by granting certiorari to Medtronic v.
Lohr.78
IV. FACTS OF LoHR
A. District Court
The plaintiff, Lora Lohr, received a pacemaker manufactured by Medtronic
in 1987. Three years later, the pacemaker failed and Lohr required emergency
surgery to treat her condition. Lohr, only twenty-seven when her pacemaker
failed, received four more operations to fix the damage caused by the defective
pacemaker.79 Lohr sued Medtronic under Florida tort law for claims of
negligent design, manufacturing, and warning in marketing the pacemaker.80
In its defense, Medtronic argued that the MDA's preemption clause barred
states from imposing requirements different from federal law. Based on the
precedent established in Cipollone, these requirements included state common
law actions. Medtronic successfully removed this case to federal court and
motioned for summary judgment.81 The district court denied Medtronic's
motion in December 1993, but reconsidered its decision in light of the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Duncan v. lolab Corp.82 Upon remand, the court interpreted
Duncan to preempt all state law suits based on negligence and strict liability
and granted Medtronic's motion for summary judgment. 83
B. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
The Eleventh Circuit narrowed the district court's approach by affirming in
part and reversing in part.84 The court based its holding on the applicable
preemption language in the MDA and on the fact that the device was not
subjected to the full PMA approval process.85 The FDA regulations state that
the MDA "allows preemption when the FDA has established counterpart
regulations or there exists requirements applicable to a particular device under
the Act."86 In addressing the negligent design claim, the court held that the
78Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
79 See Device Makers Can Face State Suits Over Defects, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 1, 1996,
at 14.
80 Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1340. The FDA approved Medtronic's pacemaker in 1982, after
determining that it was substantially equivalent to other devices on the market prior to
1976.
81Id.
8212 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994).
83 Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1340.
84Id. at 1335.
851d. at 1348-49.
861d. at 1339.
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MDA did not establish specific design requirements on 510(k) devices.8 7 Under
the 510(k) process, the FDA made no examination of the safety of a device. Since
no specific design requirements existed, the MDA did not preempt a state law
cause of action for the negligent design of a medical device.
Turning to the negligent manufacturing claims, the court held that the "good
manufacturing practice regulations in the MDA" were specific requirements
which justified the preemption of these claims.88 Since the plaintiffs' negligent
manufacturing claim constituted a specific manufacturing requirement
different from or in addition to the GMP regulations, the MDA preempted this
claim. 89 Additionally, the court reasoned that the plaintiff's failure to warn
claim was a specific requirement triggering preemption.90 Despite their lack of
device specificity, the labeling regulations were specific about "what standards
a manufacture must follow when designing the packaging and labeling of its
product."91 Finally, the court held that the MDAdid not prevent a manufacturer
from creating an unreasonably dangerous product through specific design
requirements; therefore, the strict liability claim would not be preempted.9
2
This holding exemplifies the position advocated by the majority of
jurisdictions that the MDA does not have to create device-specific regulations
for state lawsuits to be preempted. 93 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that a
determination of whether the MDA preempts a state lawsuit must occur on a
claim by claim basis in order to '"best carry out Congressional design."94 In
seeking certiorari, Medtronic argued that design defects are preempted by the
MDA's preemption clause.95 Meanwhile, Lohr also sought Supreme Court
87 Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1349-52. The court looked to the legislative history of the MDA and
found that Congress recognized the differences between the two process:
We can view the MDA as a compromise between device manu-
facturers and Congress. In exchange for the financial and time
burdens placed upon manufacturers by the MDA, the manufacturers
were assured a nationally uniform and predictable regulatory and
liability climate. A rule preempting liability based on grandfathering
would give the benefits of a uniform, predictable liability climate to
devices that never paid the MDA's regulatory "price" for market entry.
Id. at 1349.
88Id. at 1350; see Good Manufacturing Practice Regulations (GMP), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(f);
21 C.F.R. §§ 820.1-820.198.
89 Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1350.
901d. at 1351.
9 11d. at 1351; see 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.109, 807.87(e) (labeling regulations).
92 Lohr,56 F.3d at 1352.
931d. at 1344. The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit which accepts the position that a
requirement must be device-specific; see also Angu iano, 44 F.3d at 809.
94 Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1352.
95 Brief for Petitioners, Medtronic v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (1996 WL 88789).
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review of this case based on the denial of her negligent manufacturing and
failure to warn claims.
C. Supreme Court
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court ruled that common law claims
against medical device manufacturers of Class III devices for negligent design,
manufacturing, and labeling are not preempted under the MDA. 96 The
decision sought to resolve the twenty-year old debate over whether the
statutory language in the MDA, or the regulations established by the FDA,
guaranteed manufacturers immunity from state suits. The Court found
Medtronic's argument that common law cause of action constitutes a
requirement under 360k(a) to be implausible.97 If the Court adopted
Medtronic's view of the preemption clause, Justice Stevens concluded that
"Congress [would have] effectively precluded state courts from affording
consumers any protections from injuries resulting from a defective medical
device."98 Since the MDA delineates no private causes of action, this would
effectively bar "most, if not all, relief for persons injured by defective medical
devices."99
1. Negligent Design Claims Under Section 510(k)
In holding that Lohr's negligent design claims were not preempted, the
Court looked to the expressed statutory language in the MDA.100 Since
Congress fashioned the language in the preemption section ambiguously, the
Court looked to the FDA for guidance in interpreting the statute and
unanimously determined that the MDA does not create specific, federal design
requirements for 510(k) devices which conflict with state tort laws.101 The
premarket notification process under section 510(k) centers on the equivalence
of a device, not ensuring the safety of the product or requiring the device to
take any particular form. The standard offers little of the consumer protection
promised in the statute and the exemption process did nothing to improve the
96 Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2240. Justice Stevens' majority opinion was joined by Justices
Ginsberg, Kennedy, Souter, and a separate concurrence in the result by Justice Breyer.
971d. at 2244. The Court stated that Medtronic's preemption argument was "not only
unpersuasive, it is implausible." Id. at 2251.
9 8 1d. at 2251.
99Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2251; see also Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments:
A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 511, 526-27 (1988) (detailing the lack of remedies available to provide plaintiffs
compensatory damages due to defective products).
10OLohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2255.
1011d. at 2252-53. Justice Stevens held that Congress "was primarily concerned with
the problem of specific, conflicting State statutes and regulations rather than the general
duties enforced by common-law actions." Id. at 2252.
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safety of medical devices, rather it maintained the status quo.102 The FDA
allowed Lohr's pacemaker, as a device substantially equivalent to one which
existed before 1976, to be marketed without being subjected to the rigorous
standards in the full PMA process. Therefore, the MDA does not preempt
negligent design state lawsuits since the FDA did not examine the merits or
safety of the pacemaker.
2. "Requirement" Under Section 360k(a)
Medtronic argued that a common law action qualifies as a requirement
under section 360k(a) of the MDA. 103 If upheld, medical device manufacturers
would receive complete immunity from design defect liability suits despite
congressional intent to enact more stringent safeguards. In Justice Stevens'
majority opinion, he stated that "preemption will occur only where a particular
state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest."104 State
requirements must differ from or add additional requirements to a federal law
to invoke the preemption doctrine. In Lohr, the state tort laws were not
specifically designed to regulate medical devices. Rather, these statutes were
generally designed to govern a variety of circumstances and to provide
plaintiffs with remedies not available under the MDA. Under this system, no
direct conflict exists between federal and state law. Therefore, these state laws
do not qualify as the type of requirements which Congress and the FDA feared
would impede the implementation and enforcement of uniform national
requirements.
In contrast to Cipollone, the Court believed that Florida's tort laws did not
qualify as an additional requirement which necessitated federal preemption.
Justice Stevens asserted that "[njothing in 360k(a) denied Florida the right to
provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common law duties,
even if those duties parallel federal requirements."105 Section 360k(a) is limited
to "device-specific enactments of positive law by legislative or administrative
bodies, not the application of general rules of common law by judges and
juries."'1 06 The damage remedy available under state tort law merely provides
an additional reason for manufacturers to comply with identical federal
remedies.107 This rationale comports with the regulations promulgated by the
FDA.
In reversing the appellate court's preemption of Lohr's manufacturing and
labeling claims, the Supreme Court held that these federal standards were
1021d. at 2254.
103Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2254.
104 d. at 2255.
105 d. at 2256.
1061d. at 2252.
107Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2255-56.
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applicable to the device in question.10 8 However, the good manufacturing
requirements reflect generally applicable regulations governing the
pacemaker. These requirements differ from the specific regulations which the
MDA's preemption clause introduced to protect manufacturers from facing
contradictory state requirements. Justice Stevens stated that "given the critical
importance of device-specificity in the FDA's construction of 360k(a), it is
apparent that few, if any, common law duties have been preempted by this
statute."109 Cipollone's expansive view of the term "requirement" has been
severely curtailed in Lohr by requiring a higher degree of device-specificity.
The Court stopped short of declaring that common law actions will never
be requirements within the meaning of section 360k(a). However, the Court did
suggest that few common law requirements are device-specific so that "it will
be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of action to issue a
decree that has the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific
device."110 This viewpoint is consistent with the Court's prior refusal to
"remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."l1
Justice Stevens explicitly stated that "we cannot accept Medtronic's argument
that by using the term 'requirement,' Congress clearly signaled its intent to
deprive States of any role in protecting consumers from the dangers inherent
in many medical devices."112 As a result, Lohr's common law action was
remanded to the district court to determine Medtronic's liability under Florida
tort law.113
3. Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Stephen Breyer issued the fifth and deciding vote which created
questions over the authority of the majority's holding. In his pivotal
concurrence, Justice Breyer held that there may be instances where federal law
does not preclude state lawsuits. 114 However, he may have limited the Court's
holding to cases brought against medical devices approved by the FDA under
the premarket notification process. Therefore, the Court's holding may not
apply to devices approved under the more rigid premarket process. Justice
Breyer described his view of the preemption doctrine by stating, "I believe that
ordinarily, insofar as the MDA preempts a state requirement embodied in a
state statute, rule, regulation, or other administrative action, it would also
preempt a similar requirement that takes the form of a standard of care or
108 d. at 2257.
109d, at 2259.
110Id. at 2259 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995)).
111Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 623 (1984).
112Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2252.
1131d. at 2259.
1141d.
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behavior imposed by a state tort law action.11 5 Justice Breyer rejected Justice
Stevens' view that the term 'any requirement' in the MDA's preemption clause
does not encompass the requirements imposed through state common law
actions. 116 Justice Breyer found this approach to be inconsistent with the
express language of the MDA and the Court's prior decision in Cipollone.117
Justice Breyer held that section 360(k) preempts state actions when compliance
with both federal regulations and state common law standards is impossible." 8
Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer believed that future incidents of MDA
preemption of common law "will not be few or rare."119
Justice Breyer believed that a requirement need not be device-specific to fall
within the MDA's preemptive scope. 120 Preemption will apply when the
application of state law conflicts with the requirements of the MDA and when
FDA regulations conflict with the liability creating premises of a common law
action.12 1 When the federal regulatory scheme is "so pervasive as to infer
Congress left no room for supplementation by the states," preemption of state
actions should occur.122 In looking at the applicable regulations, Justice Breyer
concluded that "[no] indication exists that either Congress or the FDA intended
that the relevant FDA regulations [would] occupy entirely any relevant
field."123
Due to Justice Breyer's concurrence, no clear guidance exists for federal
preemption questions except for devices approved under the limited 510(k)
process. 124 Therefore, Justice Breyer's concurrence leaves unanswered what
will occur with devices approved under the PMA. As one commentator stated,
115d. at 2260.
116 Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2260.
1171d. at 2261.
1181d. at 2259-60. Breyer exemplified this conflict by explaining that it would create
conflicting requirements to allow a federal MDA regulation requiring a two-inch wire,
while a state agency requires a one-inch wire. Id. Similarly, it would be anomalous to
allow a state law tort action premised on one-inch requirements if a federal regulation
dictates otherwise. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
119d. at 2262.
1201d. at 2261.
121Id.
122 Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)) (Breyer looked not only to section 360k of the statute, but to the FDA regulations
in 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) in interpreting Congressional intent).
123Id.
124 Breyer's indecision is reflected in his statement that "the MDA will sometimes
preempt a state tort law suit. I basically agree with Justice O'Connor's discussion of this
point and with her conclusion." Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2259.
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the Lohr opinion "created more of a mess than before." 125 With Justice Breyer's
swing vote casting doubt over the expansiveness of the preemption doctrine,
the question of how Lohr relates to Cipollone remains unanswered and frustrates
the Court's objective in granting certiorari to this case.
4. Dissent
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist concurred with part of the
ruling, but dissented from the main part of the opinion. Justice O'Connor
referred to the majority's opinion as "bewildering and seemingly without
guiding principle."126 In contrast to the majority holding, Justice O'Connor
professed that a state law claim would be preempted if it imposes any
requirement "different from" or "in addition to" the requirements under federal
law.127 Justice O'Connor rejected the concept of device-specificity as a
prerequisite to bringing suit by stating that "[t]he statute makes no mention of
a requirement of specificity."128 When the language of the statute is clear, a court
need not seek an agency's interpretation of the statute.129 Thus, a court need
look no further than the express language of the statute to conclude whether
the preemption doctrine will apply.
Justice O'Connor believed that the majority's opinion contradicted the
Court's prior ruling in Cipollone.130 She referred to Justice Stevens' attempt to
differentiate the statute in Cipollone as "neither clear nor persuasive."131 In
Justice O'Connor's opinion, Cipollone declared that common law actions may
not impose requirements in addition to those dictated in federal laws. In
analyzing section 360(k)'s ordinary meaning, Justice O'Connor held that this
provision clearly preempts any state common law action which imposes a
requirement "different from" or "in addition to" those applicable under the
MDA.132 The dissent held that the majority's analysis was at odds with the
plain meaning of the MDA and the general understanding of common law
damage actions. 133
125See James Cahoy, U.S. Supreme Court: Medical Device Patients Can Sue in State Courts,
WEST LEGAL NEWS, June 27, 1996, at 1996 WL 354146 (quoting Lars Noah, professor of
products liability at the University of Florida).
126Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2262.
1271d. at 2263.
1281d.
129Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (1984).
1301n light of Justice Breyer's agreement with this position, a majority of the court held
that the MDA does in certain instances preempt state law actions. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2263.
1311d.
13 21d.
1331d.
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Justice O'Connor concluded by stating that the MDA contained specific
manufacturing and labeling requirements which were applicable to
Medtronic's pacemaker 34 The dissent believed that these requirements were
specific enough under section 360(k) to preempt Lohr's state actions and
comprehensive enough to preempt any common law claim based on negligent
manufacturing and labeling.135 Therefore, Lohr's negligent design claims
could proceed, but her negligent manufacturing and warning claims were
preempted by federal law. Unlike the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor
disagreed with the contention that "few, if any common law duties will be
preempted by the MDA."136 Due to the MDA's broad use of the term
'requirement,' manufacturers may argue against state jury decisions which
establish conflicting standards with those dictated by federal regulations.
V. LOHR'S IMPACT ON THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY
Based on the plurality holding in Lohr, the preemption defense may still be
available to companies who market medical devices under the PMA procedure.
In Lohr, the Court found significant differences between the PMA and the
premarket notification procedure in section 510(k). 137 Due to the lack of
scrutiny in the premarket notification process, the MDA does not impose any
requirements on devices grandfathered through the regulatory process. 138
However, the more stringent standards embodied in the PMA may justify a
finding of a requirement under section 360(k). Since state common law actions
may impose requirements 'different from' or 'in addition to' the PMA
standards, preemption will continue to occur when state tort claims directly
conflict with federal requirements imposed on medical devices. However,
post-Lohr decisions have adopted the majority's holding that the PMA does not
impose specific requirements triggering preemption.139 Even in one post-Lohr
case involving device-specific regulatory requirements, the preemption
defense has not been extended. 140
134 Lohr, 116 S. Ct. at 2264.
1351d.
1361d. (quoting Stevens assertion).
137 However, the enactment of the Safe Medical Device Act of 1990 creates greater
FDA scrutiny of 510(k) devices. This may allow manufacturers to argue that the current
510(k) process more closely assimilates the requirements of the PMA.
138See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(B)(I)(2)(A)-(E); 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R.
§ 814.(C)(1) (1994).
139See Walker v. Johnson & Johnson, 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (MDA
does not provide blanket preemption since PMA is not a specific requirement); Kemats
v. Smith Indus. Med. Sys., 669 N.E.2d 1300 (Il. App. Ct. 1996) (despite device being
subjected to PMA, section 360(k) does not preempt state law claims).
140Armstrong v. Optical Radiation, 50 Cal. App. 4th 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(device-specific requirements not enough to preempt state law claims).
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Justice Breyer's concurrence along with the four dissenting Justices indicates
that a majority of the Court believes the term 'requirement' to encompass state
law claims under certain circumstances. 141 Justice Breyer's concurrence has
been interpreted to hold that if a federal requirement conflicts with the "liability
creating premise of a plaintiff state law tort suit," then the MDA will preempt
this action.142 This mixed signal to both plaintiffs and defendants may "create
further litigation as lower courts struggle to give meaning to the Supreme
Court's opinion."143 Since the Court's decision in Lohr, a number of courts have
adopted the previous "minority" viewpoint and have allowed plaintiffs to
bring state law causes of action under the MDA.144 The resolution of this
conflict remains unresolved by the Court's plurality holding.
In the post-Lohr case of Comeau v. Heller, the court revisited the applicability
of the preemption doctrine to state law claims. 145 The manufacturer in this case
argued that Justice Stevens' distinction between the PMA and the premarket
notification process limits Lohr to its particular facts. 146 However, this court
held that the Supreme Court failed to limit its decision to devices approved
under section 510(k).147 Based on this interpretation, the court allowed the
plaintiff's state lawsuit to proceed despite approval of the device under the full
PMA process.148 Prior to the Lohr decision, lower courts construed the
preemption provision in section 360(k) to expressly prohibit any requirement
141116 S. Ct. at 2260, 2264.
142 Papike v. Tambrands, 107 F.3d 737, 742 (9th Cir. 1997).
143 AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION PRESS RELEASE, June 26, 1996. Various cases
have been remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's holding
in Lohr. See, e.g., Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); English v.
Mentor Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Mentor Corp. v. Feldt, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996);
Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 116S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., 116
S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Mentor Corp. v. Gingham, 116 S. Ct. 2577 (1996); Falcone v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., No. Civ. A. 96-2943,1996 WL 482981 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23,1996); Romano
v. Medtronic, 650 N.Y.S.2d 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (MDA does not preempt common
law merely because the device has undergone the premarket notification procedure).
144 See Headen v. Mentor Corp., No. Civ. A. 96-1495, 1997 WL 27104 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23,
1997); Montoya v. Mentor Corp., 919 P.2d 410 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); Walker, 552 N.W.2d
679; Kernats, 669 N.E.2d 1300; Connelly, 927 S.W.2d 848; Armstrong, 50 Cal. App. 4th 580;
Green v. Dolsky, 685 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1432 (1997); Committee
of Dental Amalgam v. Stratton, 92 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 754
(1997); Berish v. Richards Med. Co., 937 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. N.Y. 1996); Sanders v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 92 F.3d 1181 (4th Cir. 1996); Shea v. Oscor Med. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 246
(N.D. Ill. 1996).
145945 F. Supp. 7, 8 (D. Mass. 1996).
1461d.
14 71d.
148Id. at 11. See also Sowell v. Bausch & Lomb, No. 57714, WL 169413 1997 N.Y. App.
Div. Lexis 3716 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 10, 1997)(holding that mere fact that device has
received PMA does not guarantee preemption under MDA).
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"different from" or "in addition to" the FDA's medical device requirements. 149
Now, companies seeking to market medical devices approved under the
section 510(k) process may no longer defend against state law actions by
claiming federal preemption under section 360(k).
The impact of the Court's holding in Lohr may affect thousands of lawsuits
involving other allegedly defective medical devices. These devices range from
silicone breast implants, hearing aids, heart valves, and hip or knee
replacements. 150 In addition, the decision on the expansiveness of the
preemption doctrine prompted dozens of other industries to submit
friend-of-the-court briefs. 151 The holding in Lohr has prompted courts to limit
the preemption doctrine in areas other than medical device litigation.152 An
estimated eleven million people currently have implanted medical devices. 15 3
According to most commentators, if Medtronic had won this case, all
manufacturers of medical devices would have been immunized from liability
despite the harm inflicted by their devices.' 54 The Supreme Court found this
argument to be contrary to Congressional intent. In enacting the MDA,
Congress attempted to institute a federal law which would prevent consumers
from suffering injuries from dangerous medical devices such as the Dalkon
shield.155 However, during the past twenty years, the MDA has served to limit
consumers' ability to seek damages for injuries suffered from these products.
As courts begin to reinterpret the MDA based on the holding in Lohr, it will be
149 See also Brian J. Donato et al., Medtronic v. Lohr: Has Device Preemption Been Totally
Preempted?, BIOMEDICAL MARKET NEWS., Aug. 1, 1996.
150 See Paul Barrett, Lora Lohr's Pacemaker May Alter Liability Law, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,
1996, at BI (U.S. District Court Judge Sam Pointer Jr. stated in a March 25th opinion that
the Lohr holding could "significantly affect" the thousands of silicone breast implants
lawsuits around the country).
151 See Kathryn Ericson, Friends of the Court Step Up As U.S. Supreme Court Prepares to
HearMedical Device Preemption Case, WEST LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 10, 1996, at 1996 WL 259713
(this article provides a complete list of the friend of the court briefs submitted in Lohr).
152 See Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96 F.3d 552 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1083 (1997) (Flammable Fabrics Act does not preempt common law products
liability claims); Ketchum v. Hyundai Motor Co., 49 Cal. App. 4th 1672, 1677 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (defective safety restraints not preempted by National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act); Washington v. Falco S & D Inc., No. Civ. A 96-2066,1996 WL 627999
(E.D. La. Oct. 29, 1996) (plaintiffs claims were not preempted by Occupational Safety
and Health Act).
153See Medical Device Makers Face State Courts Suits, Federal Law No Shield, Supreme
Court Rules, CHICAGO TRiB., June 27, 1996.
154See, e.g., Ashley Warren, Preemption of Claims Related to Class Ill Medical Devices: Are
the Federal Objectives of Public Health and Safety Furthered or Hindered?, 49 SMU L. REv.
619, 636 (1996) (offering suggestions on how to best balance the conflicting principles
in developing innovative medical products).
15 5See Javitt, supra note 13.
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interesting to assess whether the Congressional goal of providing safer medical
devices will be achieved.
With the curtailment of the preemption doctrine, the Lohr decision may have
a chilling effect on the innovation of new medical devices. As Rep. Thomas
Bliley stated in his response to the Lohr decision, "[w]ho will be willing to
supply American patients with pacemakers and heart pumps, knowing that
they can be hauled into any one of fifty different state courts even if they
scrupulously comply with the rigorous standards set forth by the FDA?"156 The
possibility of being held liable for innovative medical products may serve to
reduce the impetus to market experimental medical devices. Higher liability
premiums, elevated number of lawsuits, and increased costs of medical devices
may result from the lack of preemption of state actions.157 Funding will be
deterred from research and development of new medical products.158 The
desire to balance the conflicting ideals of public health versus medical
innovation makes the medical device industry unique. By being implanted into
individuals to help sustain or support life, these devices lack the guarantee of
success which can be expected of devices in other industries.
Under the Lohr ruling, a jury rather than the FDA will determine what
constitutes a safe medical device.159 This will subject manufacturers to
divergent state product liability laws nationwide. In attempting to resolve the
dispute over the scope of the MDA's preemption clause, the Supreme Court
failed to provide clear guidelines to manufacturers in all industries who engage
in state commerce. The Lohr ruling may have potentially far-reaching
ramifications for the health care industry. The right to sue medical device
manufacturers may lead to fewer lawsuits against physicians, hospitals, and
other health care delivery organizations as plaintiffs look to the deep-pockets
of corporations. 160 In this era of tort reform at both the state and federal level,
the Lohr decision may strengthen the push for product liability reform in
Congress and state legislatures. However, the state tort law system should
continue to function "as an incentive for manufacturers to continue to improve
their products as well as to disclose developments in product safety and their
156Thomas J. Bliley, House Commerce Committee Chairman Rep., Text of Bliley
Reaction to Medtronic v. Lohr Decision, Gov'r PRESS RELEASE, June 26, 1996, at 1996 WL
8788743.
15 7Greg Borzo, Justices Remove Liability Protection for Device Makers, AM. MED. NEWS 8,
Aug. 5, 1996.
15 8Id.
159Brief of the American Insurance Association, the American Tort Reform
Association and the National Association of Manufacturers as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Medtronic v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). Victor Schwartz, one of the
attorneys who filed this friend-of-the-court brief, stated: "What this boils down to is
whether we want to have the experts at the FDA tell us what is a safe pacemaker or do
we want a jury deciding it one way in Brooklyn and another way in Missouri?" See
Barrett, supra note 9.
16 0Borzo, supra note 157.
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side effects."161 Under Lohr, manufacturers will no longer be shielded from
liability despite the harm their products cause. As a result, injured plaintiffs
will now be guaranteed their due process rights to remuneration against a
corporation no longer protected by the federal preemption defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to Lohr, the majority of jurisdictions preempted state product liability
suits for devices cleared for marketing and distribution under the MDA. With
the Court's plurality opinion, there exists the potential for regulatory chaos
with corporations being subjected to different laws imposed by various states.
The Court in Lohr alludes to, but fails to explicitly define the scope of federal
preemption. For a common law tort action to be preempted by the MDA, the
state law must impose requirements on a device in addition to those required
by federal law. In its regulatory process, the FDA did not impose specific design
requirements on Medtronic's pacemaker triggering preemption under section
360(k). In addition, the Court believed that the Lohr's labeling claims should
not be preempted, since the FDA's labeling requirements were not
device-specific, but generally applicable to all devices. However, devices which
the FDA subjects to device-specific regulations may still be protected from state
action through federal preemption. The Lohr ruling eliminates the federal
preemption defense in product liability cases involving devices cleared by the
FDA under section 510(k). However, the preemption defense may still exist for
companies whose devices have been cleared under either the investigational
device exemption or the PMA standard. With the continuing vitality of the
preemption defense in question, manufacturers must be prepared to face tort
liability suits for placing defective products on the market. By allowing
plaintiffs state law remedies, the goal of the MDA may finally be achieved as
manufacturers take responsibility for the products which they market.
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